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Abstract: Preference relations are very useful to express decision makers’ preferences 
over alternatives in the process of group decision-making. However, the multiple 
self-confidence levels are not considered in existing preference relations. In this study, we 
define the preference relation with self-confidence by taking multiple self-confidence levels 
into consideration, and we call it the preference relation with self-confidence. Furthermore, 
we present a two-stage linear programming model for estimating the collective preference 
vector for the group decision-making based on heterogeneous preference relations with 
self-confidence. Finally, numerical examples are used to illustrate the two-stage linear 
programming model, and a comparative analysis is carried out to show how self-confidence 
levels influence on the group decision-making results. 
Keywords:	 Preference relations, self-confidence levels, collective preference vector, 
linear programming model. 
1. Introduction 
Preference relations are widely used in group decision-making (GDM). An n n×  
complete preference relation contains 2n  preference elements, and each element indicates 
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the degree up to which an alternative is preferred to another one [30, 31, 33-35]. Sometimes, 
decision makers have no self-confidence on the preference information because of time 
pressure and limited expertise regarding the problem domain. In these situations, decision 
makers may provide their preference information in the form of incomplete preference 
relations, i.e. a preference relation with some of its elements missing [1, 23, 24, 38-40]. 
In a complete preference relation, the decision maker provides all preference 
information, and it is generally assumed that all preference values are provided with the same 
self-confidence level. In an incomplete preference relation, two self-confidence levels are 
used: (1) The decision maker is of self-confidence for those preference elements for which a 
value is provided and (2) the decision maker is without self-confidence for the preference 
elements for which a value is not given. 
However, multiple self-confidence levels different to the two levels case mentioned 
above are not considered in existing preference relations. Therefore, it would be of great 
importance to provide decision makers with tools to allow them to express multiple 
self-confidence levels when providing their preferences. In this study, we propose the 
preference relation with self-confidence by taking multiple self-confidence levels into 
consideration, and we call it the preference relation with self-confidence. In the preference 
relation with self-confidence, each element consists of two components, the first one is the 
preference value between pairs of alternatives, and the second part, which is defined on a 
linguistic terms set, represents the decision maker’s self-confidence level of its corresponding 
first part or preference value. 
In practical GDM problems, each decision maker has different knowledge, experience, 
culture and educational backgrounds. As a result, the decision makers use different preference 
relations to express their individual preference information. Three kinds of preference 
relations have been widely investigated: multiplicative preference relations [5, 26, 33, 41], 
additive preference relations [6, 19, 31, 34-36, 41] and linguistic preference relations [8, 9, 
11, 16, 20, 28, 37]. Chiclana et al. [4, 5], Dong et al. [12, 14], Herrera et al. [26], and 
Herrera-Viedma et al. [21] initiated and developed the GDM models with heterogeneous 
preference relations represented by preference orderings, utility functions, additive preference 
relations, multiplicative preference relations. Moreover, Fan et al. [18] and Ma et al. [29] 
initiated several optimization-based models to integrate heterogeneous preference relations. 
The GDM problem with heterogeneous preference relations has become one of the major 
areas of GDM researches [3]. 
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An important challenge to bear in mind when decision makers provide different 
preference relations with self-confidence is how to obtain the collective solution. In this 
paper, a two-stage linear programming model to deal with GDM problems based on 
heterogeneous preference relations with self-confidence is developed. This two-stage linear 
programming model is based on a distance-based framework that minimizes the information 
deviation between decision makers’ preference relations and collective preference vector, and 
that is presented first. .  
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic knowledge 
regarding ordinal linguistic 2-tuples model and the three kinds of preference relations 
mentioned above. Section 3 defines the preference relations with self-confidence and 
describes the GDM problem based on heterogeneous preference relations with 
self-confidence. Section 4 proposes a distance-based framework that is used to develop a 
two-stage linear programming model for estimating the collective preference vector in the 
GDM. Section 5 provides numerical examples and a comparative analysis to show how 
self-confidence levels influence on the GDM results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the study. 
2. Preliminaries 
In this section, and with the aim of making this study self-contained, preliminary 
concepts regarding the ordinal linguistic 2-tuple model and the three main type of preference 
relations used in this framework are covered. 
2.1 The ordinal 2-tuple linguistic model 
The ordinal 2-tuple linguistic model is used in this study to carry out ordinal computing 
with words when dealing with the linguistic self-confidence levels information. The basic 
notations and operational laws of ordinal linguistic variables are introduced in [13, 15, 25, 27], 
a summary of which is provided below. 
Let { | 0,  1,  ...,  }iS s i g= =  be a linguistic term set with odd cardinality. The term is  
represents a possible value of a linguistic variable. The following ordinal ordering on set S  
is assumed:  
i js s>  if and only if i j> . 
Herrera and Martínez presented the ordinal 2-tuple linguistic model in [25], and it was 
based in the following adapted definition:  
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Definition 1 (Herrera and Martínez [25]): Let [0,  ]gβ ∈  be a number in the 
granularity interval of the linguistic term set 0{ ,  ...,  }gS s s=  and let ( )i round β=  and 
iα β= −  be two values such that [0,  ]i g∈  and [ 0.5,  0.5)α∈ − . Then, α  is called a 
symbolic translation, with round  being the usual rounding  operation. 
Herrera and Martínez’s model represents the linguistic information by means of ordinal 
2-tuples ( ,  )is α , where is  is a simple term in S  and [ 0.5,0.5)α∈ − . A one-to-one 
mapping between ordinal linguistic 2-tuples and numerical values in [0, g] is possible. 
Definition 2 (Herrera and Martínez [25]): Let 0{ ,  ...,  }gS s s=  be a linguistic term set 
and [0,  ]gβ ∈  a value representing the result of a symbolic aggregation operation, then the 
ordinal 2-tuple that expresses the equivalent information to β  is obtained with the following 
function: Δ : [0,  g]→ S ×[−0.5,  0.5) , where 
( ) ( , )isβ αΔ = , with 
,  ( )
,  [ 0.5,  0.5).
is i round
i
β
α β α
=⎧
⎨
= − ∈ −⎩
 
For convenience, denoting by S = S ×[−0.5,  0.5)  the inverse function of Δ  is 
1 : [0,  ]S g−Δ →  with 1(( , ))is iα α
−Δ = + . For notation simplicity, this paper sets 
1 1(( ,0)) ( )i is s
− −Δ =Δ . Clearly, an ordering on the set of ordinal 2-tuples and a negation 
operator are possible to define as follows: 
1) Let ( ,  )ks α  and ( ,  )ls γ  be two ordinal 2-tuples. Then: 
(1) if k l< , then ( ,  )ks α  is smaller than ( ,  )ls γ . 
(2) if k l= , then  
(a) if α γ= , then ( ,  )ks α  and ( ,  )ls γ  represents the same information. 
(b) if α γ< , then ( ,  )ks α  is smaller than ( ,  )ls γ . 
2) Ordinal 2-tuple negation operator: 
                1(( , )) ( ( ( , ))).i iNeg s g sα α
−=Δ − Δ                       (1) 
2.2 Preference relations 
In this subsection, we introduce multiplicative preference relations, additive preference 
relations and ordinal 2-tuple linguistic preference relations.  
(1)  Multiplicative preference relations 
 Saaty introduced multiplicative preference relations in [33]. 
Definition 3 [33]: Let 1 2{ , ,..., }nX x x x=  be a finite set of alternatives. A multiplicative 
preference relation ( )ij n nA a ×=  on X  is described by a positive preference relation 
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A X X⊂ × , with element ija  measuring on a ratio scale [1/9, 9] the intensity of preference 
of alternative ix  over alternative jx . The following interpretation is assumed: 1ija =  
indicates indifference between ix  and jx ; 9ija =  indicates that ix  is absolutely preferred 
to jx , and {2,3,...,8}ija ∈  indicates intermediate evaluations. It is assumed that 1ij jia a =  
and 1iia = . 
(2)  Additive preference relations 
Additive preference relations are also called fuzzy preference relations [4, 21, 31]. 
Definition 4 [31]:  An additive preference relation P  on a finite set of alternatives 
X  is a relation in X X×  that is characterised by a membership function 
: [0,1]P X Xµ × → , where ( , )P i j ijx x pµ =  denotes the preference degree or intensity of the 
alternative ix  over jx . The following interpretation is assumed: 0.5ijp =  indicates 
indifference between ix  and jx , 0.5ijp >  indicates a definite preference for ix  over jx , 
1ijp =  indicates the maximum degree of preference for ix  over jx . It is assumed that 
1ij jip p+ =  and 0.5iip = . 
(3)  Ordinal 2-tuple linguistic preference relations 
Let { | 0,  1,  ...,  }iS s i g= =  be an ordinal linguistic term set with odd cardinality as 
introduced in Section 2.1. 
Definition 5 [27]: An ordinal 2-tuple linguistic preference relation T  on a finite set of 
alternatives X  is defined as ( )ij n nT t ×= , where ijt S∈  denotes the degree of linguistic 
preference of the alternative ix  over jx . The following interpretation is assumed: 
2
ij gt s=  
indicates indifference between ix  and jx , 
2
ij gt s>  indicates a definite preference for ix  
over jx , and 
2
ij gt s<  indicates a definite preference for jx  over ix . It is assumed that 
2
ii gt s=  and ( )ij jit Neg t= .  
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Initially, the decision maker expresses her/his preferences using the simple ordinal terms 
of S , and the ordinal 2-tuple linguistic values only appear after operations on simple ordinal 
terms are carried out. 
2.3 Transitivity of preferences 
Transitivity is an important concept to apply to preference relations to assess their 
rationality. Here, we list there different transitive properties of preference relations, with the 
third one being a stronger condition than the second one, which in turn is stronger than the 
first one. 
Let ( )ij n nA a ×=  be a multiplicative preference relation. Some transitive properties of 
multiplicative preference relations can be described as follows: 
(a) Weak stochastic transitivity: 1, 1 1 ,  ,  .ij jk ika a a i j k≥ ≥ ⇒ ≥ ∀  
(b) Strong stochastic transitivity: 1, 1 max( , ) ,  ,  .ij jk ik ij jka a a a a i j k≥ ≥ ⇒ ≥ ∀  
(c) Multiplicative transitivity:  ,  ,  .ij jk ika a a i j k= ∀  
The equivalent properties for additive preference relations and 2-tuple linguistic 
preference relations are also described as follows. Let ( )ij n nP p ×=  be an additive preference 
relation. 
(a) Weak stochastic transitivity: 0.5, 0.5 0.5 ,  ,  .ij jk ikp p p i j k≥ ≥ ⇒ ≥ ∀  
(b) Strong stochastic transitivity: 0.5, 0.5 max( , ) ,  ,  .ij jk ik ij jkp p p p p i j k≥ ≥ ⇒ ≥ ∀  
(c) Additive transitivity: pij = pik − p jk +0.5 ∀i,  j,  k.  
Let ( )ij n nT t ×=  be an ordinal 2-tuple linguistic preference relation. 
(a) Weak stochastic transitivity: 
2 2 2
,  ,  ,  .ij g jk g ik gt s t s t s i j k≥ ≥ ⇒ ≥ ∀   
(b) Strong stochastic transitivity: 
2 2
, max( , ) ,  ,  .ij g jk g ik ij jkt s t s t t t i j k≥ ≥ ⇒ ≥ ∀   
(c) Additive transitivity: 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )  ,  ,  .
2ij ik jk
gt t t i j k− − −Δ = Δ − Δ + ∀   
A preference relation that verifies the stronger of the above three transitivity properties is 
usually referred to as a consistent preference relation following Saaty’s definition of 
consistency of multiplicative preference relations. 
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3. Preference relations with self-confidence in GDM 
In this section, we define three kinds of preference relations with self-confidence and 
describe the GDM problem	based on heterogeneous preference relations with self-confidence. 
To enable decision makers to characterize self-confidence levels in a linguistic way, a 
linguistic terms set 0 1={ ,  ,  ...,  }
SL
gS l l l  is used, with the following one being a possible 
example:  
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
{  ,   ,  ,   ,  ,  
            ,  ,   ,   }.
SLS l extremely poor l very poor l poor l slightly poor l fair
l slightly good l good l very good l extremely good
= = = = = =
= = = =
 
The decision maker uses the simple term SLil S∈  to characterize his/her self-confidence 
level over the preference value. 
3.1 Preference relations with self-confidence 
Definitions of multiplicative preference relation with self-confidence, additive 
preference relation with self-confidence and ordinal 2-tuple linguistic preference relation with 
self-confidence on a finite set of alternatives 1 2{ ,  ,  ...,  }nX x x x=  are given below: 
Definition 6: A multiplicative preference relation with self-confidence on a finite set of 
alternatives , * (( , ))ij ij n nA a s ×= , is relation on X X×  whose elements have two 
components, the first one [1/ 9,9]ija ∈  representing the preference degree or intensity of the 
alternative  over , and the second component  representing the 
self-confidence level associated to the first component. The following conditions are 
assumed: 1ij jia a = , 1iia = , ij jis s=  and ii gs l= . 
Definition 7: An additive preference relation with self-confidence on a finite set of 
alternatives , * (( , ))ij ij n nP p s ×= , is relation on X X×  whose elements have two 
components, the first one pij ∈ [0,1]  representing the preference degree or intensity of the 
alternative  over , and the second component  representing the 
self-confidence level associated to the first component. The following conditions are 
assumed: 1ij jip p+ = , 0.5iip = , ij jis s=  and ii gs l= . 
X
ix jx
SL
ijs S∈
X
ix jx
SL
ijs S∈
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Definition 8: An ordinal 2-tuple linguistic preference relation with self-confidence on a 
finite set of alternatives X , T * = ((tij ,sij )) , is relation on X X×  whose elements have two 
components, the first one tij ∈ S  representing the ordinal 2-tuple linguistic preference of the 
alternative  over , and the second component  representing the 
self-confidence level associated to the first component. The following conditions are 
assumed: ( )ij jit Neg t= , 
2
ii gt s= , ij jis s=  and ii gs l= . 
Remark: Zadeh [42] developed the concept of a Z-number relates to the issue of 
reliability of information. A Z-number is an ordered pair of fuzzy numbers, the first 
component is a restriction (constraint) on the values which a real-valued uncertain variable, 
and the second component is a measure of reliability (certainty) of the first component. In our 
preference relation with self-confidence, each element can be considered to be a Z-number (in 
some sense). 
In the following, we describe some transitive properties of preference relations with 
self-confidence. 
Let * (( , ))ij ij n nA a s ×=  be a multiplicative preference relation with self-confidence. Some 
transitive properties can be described as follows: 
(a) Weak stochastic transitivity at the self-confidence level SLl S∈ . 
1, 1 1ij jk ika a a≥ ≥ ⇒ ≥ , ,  ,  i j k∀  and ijs l≥ , ,  i j∀ . 
(b) Strong stochastic transitivity at the self-confidence level SLl S∈ . 
1, 1 max( , )ij jk ik ij jka a a a a≥ ≥ ⇒ ≥ , ,  ,  i j k∀  and ijs l≥ , ,  i j∀ . 
(c) Multiplicative transitivity at the self-confidence level SLl S∈ .  
ij jk ika a a= , ,  ,  i j k∀  and ijs l≥ , ,  i j∀ . 
Let * (( , ))ij ij n nP p s ×=  be an additive preference relation with self-confidence. 
(a) Weak stochastic transitivity at the self-confidence level SLl S∈ . 
0.5, 0.5 0.5ij jk ikp p p≥ ≥ ⇒ ≥ , ,  ,  i j k∀  and ijs l≥ , ,  i j∀ . 
(b) Strong stochastic transitivity at the self-confidence level SLl S∈ . 
0.5, 0.5 max( , )ij jk ik ij jkp p p p p≥ ≥ ⇒ ≥ , ,  ,  i j k∀  and ijs l≥ , ,  i j∀ . 
(c) Additive transitivity at the self-confidence level SLl S∈ .  
ix jx
SL
ijs S∈
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0.5ij ik jkp p p= − + , ,  ,  i j k∀  and ijs l≥ , ,  i j∀ . 
Let * (( , ))ij ij n nT t s ×=  be an ordinal 2-tuple linguistic preference relation with 
self-confidence. 
(a) Weak stochastic transitivity at the self-confidence level SLl S∈ . 
2 2 2
,ij g jk g ik gt s t s t s≥ ≥ ⇒ ≥ , ,  ,  i j k∀  and ijs l≥ , ,  i j∀ . 
(b) Strong stochastic transitivity at the self-confidence level SLl S∈ . 
2 2
, max( , )ij g jk g ik ij jkt s t s t t t≥ ≥ ⇒ ≥ , ,  ,  i j k∀  and ijs l≥ , ,  i j∀ . 
(c) Additive transitivity at the self-confidence level SLl S∈ . 
1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )
2ij ik jk
gt t t− − −Δ = Δ − Δ + , ,  ,  i j k∀  and ijs l≥ , ,  i j∀ . 
The traditional definition to characterize consistency of preference relations is using a set 
of pre-established transitive properties [1, 6, 22]. In this paper, a preference relation with 
self-confidence is considered to be acceptable consistent if it satisfies the weak stochastic 
transitivity at the self-confidence level 0
SLl S∈ . 
3.2 Group decision-making problem with self-confidence 
Let 1 2{ ,  ,  ...,  }nX x x x=  be a finite set of n  alternatives. These alternatives have to be 
classified from best to worst, using the information given by a finite set of decision makers
1 2{ ,  ,  ...,  }mE e e e= . Let 1 2{ ,  ,  ...,  }mC c c c=  be a set of normalized weight/importance 
values associated to the set of experts: kc 	 is the weight/importance value of decision maker 
ke  and 0kc ≥ , 1 1
m
kk
c
=
=∑ . As each decision maker ke E∈  has their own ideas, attitudes, 
motivations, and personality, it is quite natural to consider that different decision makers will 
give their preferences in a different way. Thus, decision makers’ preferences over the set of 
alternatives X  may be represented in one of the following three ways: multiplicative 
preference relations with self-confidence, additive preference relations with self-confidence 
and ordinal 2-tuple linguistic preference relations with self-confidence. Without loss of 
generality, let 
*
11 2
{ ,  ,  ...,  }A mE e e e= , 
*
1 1 21 2
{ ,  ,  ...,  }P m m mE e e e+ += , 
*
2 21 2
{ ,  ,...,  }T m m mE e e e+ +=  
be three subsets of E , representing the set of decision makers whose preference information 
on X  are expressed as multiplicative preference relations with self-confidence, additive 
preference relations with self-confidence and ordinal 2-tuple linguistic preference relations 
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with self-confidence, respectively. The question is how to obtain a collective solution to the 
GDM problem based on heterogeneous preference relations with self-confidence level. 
4. A two-stage linear programming model 
In this section, we first propose a distance-based framework that aims to minimize the 
information deviation between decision makers’ preference relations and the collective 
preference vector, which later is used to develop a two-stage linear programming model to 
solve the GDM problem at hand. 
4.1. A distance-based framework  
Let 1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
c c c c T
nw w w w=  be the collective priority preference vector of the decision 
makers, where wi
c
i=1
n
∑ =1 and wic ≥ 0  for i∀ . In general, there are differences between 
the individual preference information and the collective solution, which can be measured as 
follows:  
(1) Let * (( , ))k k kij ij n nA a s ×= 	 be a multiplicative preference relation with self-confidence. 
The error between the preference value kija  and the collective priority preference 
vector cw  is [18, 33] 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 k c c kij i j ijw w aε = − ,  11,2,...,k m= , , 1,2,...,i j n= 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (5) 
(2) Let * (( , ))k k kij ij n nP p s ×=  be an additive preference relation with self-confidence. The 
error between the preference value kijp  and the collective priority preference vector 
cw  is [18, 31] 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
1 ( ) 0.5
2
k c c k
ij i j ijw w pε = − + − ,  1 1 21, 2,...,k m m m= + + , , 1,2,...,i j n= 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (6) 
(3) Let * (( , ))k k kij ij n nT t s ×=  be an ordinal 2-tuple linguistic preference relation with 
self-confidence. The error between the preference value kijt  and the collective 
priority preference vector cw  can be similarly defined as  
11 ( ) ( )
2 2
k c c k
ij i j ij
gw w tε −= − + − Δ ,  2 21, 2,...,k m m m= + + , , 1,2,...,i j n=     (7) 
If the individual preference relations are consistent, then it is 0kijε = .  
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When the error kijε  is at a self-confidence level of 
k
ijs  (
k SL
ijs S∈ ), the following 
information deviation can be introduced 
                1| ( ) || |k k kij ij ijz s ε
−= Δ ,  1,2,...,k m= , ,  1,  2,  ...,  i j n=               (8) 
The level of self-confidence kijs  in Eq. (8) determines the magnification of error 
k
ijε : the 
larger its value, the larger magnification will be the error kijε  assigned to the corresponding 
preference value. 
In the following, a distance-based framework that minimizes the information deviation 
between decision makers’ preference relations and the collective preference vector is 
introduced. The following objective function are introduced for metric 1 p≤ ≤∞ , 
                         1/
1 1 1
min  z= ( ( ) )
m n n
k p p
k k ij
k i j
c zα
= = =
∑ ∑∑                       (9) 
where kα  is a normalization coefficient. Due to the varying domains adopted for the variety 
of preference formats, kα 	 is used to normalize the measure of the information deviation of 
each decision maker to	eliminate the influence of heterogeneous preference relations in GDM. 
The normalization coefficients kα  is determined based on the size of the coefficient matrix 
kG . Generally, according to matrix theory and related research in [29], the value of kα  can 
be calculated as follows,  
1
k
ksp
α = ,  1,2,...,k m= 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (10) 
where ksp  is the Frobenius norm of matrix 
kG . When kG  has real number elements, the 
Frobenius norm is =k msp λ , where mλ  is the greatest eigenvalue of ( )k T kG G . 
The objective function (9) is affected by parameter p : the 1-norm distance ( 1p = ) is 
Manhattan distance; the 2-norm distance ( 2p = ) is the Euclidean distance; the infinity norm 
distance ( p =∞ ) is the Chebyshev distance. In this study, we study the 1-norm and the 
infinity norm distances. For 1p =  and p =∞ , the above objective functions are expressed 
as Eq. (11) and (12), respectively. 
                       1
1 1 1
min  z
m n n
k
k k ij
k i j
c zα
= = =
=∑ ∑∑                         (11) 
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                      2 , 1,2,...,1
min  z ( max )
m
k
k k iji j nk
c zα
=
=
=∑                       (12) 
4.2 A two-stage linear programming model based on the distance-based framework 
In this subsection, we develop a two-stage linear programming model for estimating the 
collective preference vector for the GDM, which is based on the previously introduced 
distance-based framework. In the first stage, we set 1p =  to minimize the sum of all 
information deviation of all decision makers to obtain a set of collective preference vectors. In 
the second stage, we set p =∞  and minimize the maximal information deviation of decision 
makers to select the optimal collective preference vector from the solution set of the first 
stage. 
(1) First stage: 1p =  
We use three transformed variables in model (11): ij ijy ε= , 
1( )k kij ijd t
−= Δ  and 
1( )k kij ijb s
−= Δ . The first stage linear programming model is expressed as follows: 
min  z1 = ckαk zij
k
j=1
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
k=1
m
∑                                                                                         (a)
s.t.
w
i
c − aij
kw j
c − yij
k = 0,               k =1,2,…,m1; i, j =1,  2,  ...,  n;  i < j                 (b)
1
2
(w
i
c −w
j
c )+0.5− pij
k − yij
k = 0,  k =m1 +1,m1 + 2,…,m2; i, j =1,2,...,n;  i < j(c)
1
2
(wi
c −wj
c )+ g
2
− dij
k − yij
k = 0,     k =m2 +1,m2 + 2,…,m;  i, j =1,2,...,n;  i < j(d )
zij
k −bij
k yij
k ≥ 0,                             k =1,2,…,m; i, j =1,  2,  ...,  n;  i < j              (e)
zij
k +bij
k yij
k ≥ 0,                             k =1,2,…,m; i, j =1,  2,  ...,  n;  i < j             ( f )
w1
c+w2
c + ...+wn
c=1,                                                                                          (g)
 wi
c ≥ 0,                                                               i =1,  2,  ...,  n                        (h)
zij
k ≥ 0,                                              k =1,2,…,m; i, j =1,  2,  ...,  n;  i < j        (i)
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪ 	
(13) 
In model (13), constraints ( ) ( )b d−  express the errors between the individual 
preference information and the collective preference vector; constraints ( )e  and ( )f 	
guarantee that 1| ( ) || |k k kij ij ijz s ε
−≥ Δ ; constraint ( )g  guarantees that the priority vector is 
normalized to sum to one; and finally, constraints ( )h  and ( )i 	 guarantee that variables ciw  
and cijz  are nonnegative. 
(2) Second stage: p =∞  
It is possible that there are multiple optimal solutions to the first stage model. The 
second stage model is model (12), and further selects the optimal collective preference vector 
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from the optimal solutions of the first stage model. The second stage linear programming 
model is given as follows: 
min z2 = ckαk
k=1
m
∑ (zmaxk )                                                                                                (a)
s.t.
ckαk zij
k
j=1
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
k=1
m
∑ =z1                                                                                             (b)
w
i
c − aij
kw j
c − yij
k = 0,                      k =1,2,…,m1; i, j =1,  2,  ...,  n;  i < j             (c)
1
2
(w
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c −w
j
c )+0.5− pij
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2
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zij
k +bij
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zmax
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c ≥ 0,                                         i =1,  2,  ...,  n                                                 ( j)
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	 	 	 	 	 	 (14)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	  
In model (14), constraint ( )b  ensures that only those optimal solution(s) to the first 
stage model are feasible in the second stage model, and constraint ( )h  finds max
kz . The rest 
of constraints are identical to the constraints of the first stage model. The two-stage linear 
programming model is straightforward and easy to understand and formulate, and it can be 
solved in very little computational time using readily available software such as LINGO. 
5. Numerical analysis 
In this section, we use three numerical examples to illustrate our two-stage linear 
programming model, and then we make a comparative analysis to show the influence of 
self-confidence levels on the group decision making results. 
5.1 Example 1 
We consider the following example, which includes three decision makers 
 ( 1,2,3)ke k =  and four alternatives  ( 1,2,3,4)ix i = . Suppose that the importance degree of 
each decision maker is equal, 1 / 3kc = , 1,2,3k = . The decision maker 1e  provides his/her 
preference information by the multiplicative preference relation with self-confidence *1A , the 
decision maker 2e  provides his/her preference information by the additive preference 
relation with self-confidence *2P , the decision maker 3e 	 provides his/her preference 
information by the ordinal 2-tuple linguistic preference relation with self-confidence *3T . 
These preference relations with self-confidence satisfy the weak stochastic transitivity at the 
self-confidence level 0l . 
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Based on the first stage model (13), we can obtain the value of objective function 
1 2.72z = . Based on the second stage model (14), we can obtain 2 0.71z =  and the collective 
preference vector (0.26,0.26,0.42,0.06)c Tw = . 
5.2 Example 2 
We consider the second example, which includes four decision makers  ( 1,2,3,4)ke k =  
and three alternatives  ( 1,2,3)ix i = . Suppose that the importance degree of each decision 
maker is equal, 1/ 4kc = , 1,2,3,4k = . The decision maker 1e  provides his/her preference 
information by the multiplicative preference relation with self-confidence *1A , the decision 
makers 2e  and 3e  provide their preference information by the additive preference relations 
with self-confidence *2P 	 and *3P , the decision maker 4e 	 provides his/her preference 
information by the ordinal 2-tuple linguistic preference relation with self-confidence *4T . 
The corresponding matrices are given as follows, 
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Based on the first stage model (13), we can obtain the value of objective function 
1 2.87z = . Based on the second stage model (14), we can obtain 2 1.13z =  and the 
collective preference vector (0.34,0.54,0.12)c Tw = . 
5.3 Example 3 
The third example includes six decision makers  ( 1,  2,  ...,  6)ke k =  and five 
alternatives  ( 1,  2,  ...,  5)ix i = . Suppose that 1 / 6kc = , 1,  2,  ...,  6k = . The decision makers 
1e  and 2e  provide the multiplicative preference relations with self-confidence 
*1A 	 and 
*2A , the decision makers 2e  and 3e  provide the additive preference relations with 
self-confidence *3P 	 and *4P , the decision makers 5e  and 6e 	 provide the ordinal 2-tuple 
linguistic preference relations with self-confidence *5T  and *6T . 
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Based on the first stage model (13), we can obtain the value of objective function 
1 3.43z = . Based on the second stage model (14), we can obtain 2 0.50z =  and the collective 
preference vector (0.40,0.34,0.20,0.05,0.01)c Tw = . 
5.4 Comparative analysis 
In this subsection, we study the influence of different self-confidence levels on the GDM 
results. Consider the following six matrices *11A , 
*2
1P , 
*3
1T , 
*1
2A , 
*2
2P and 
*3
2T . The matrices 
*1
1A  and 
*1
2A  have the same preference values but different self-confidence levels with 
matrix *1A  in Example 1. The matrices *21P  and 
*2
2P  have the same preference values but 
different self-confidence levels with matrix *2P  in Example 1. The matrices *31T  and 
*3
2T  
have the same preference values but different self-confidence levels with matrix *3T  in 
Example 1. The corresponding matrices are given as follows, 
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The six matrices contain two groups: the one group is the matrices *11A , 
*2
1P  and 
*3
1T , 
the other group is the matrices *12A , 
*2
2P  and 
*3
2T . Using the two-stage linear programming 
model obtains the GDM results for each group. The value of objective function 1z , the value 
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of objective function 2z  and the collective preference vectors of three groups for Example 1 
are presented in the Table 1.  
Table 1 The comparison results regarding the three groups for Example 1 
 1z  2z  cw  
*1 *2 *3( , , )A P T  2.72 0.71 (0.26,0.26,0.42,0.06)T  
*1 *2 *3
1 1 1( , , )A P T  3.40 0.84 (0.40,0.30,0.20,0.10)
T  
*1 *2 *3
2 2 2( , , )A P T  5.87 1.15 (0.46,0.24,0.26,0.04)
T  
Furthermore, we make the equivalent comparative analysis for the GDM of Example 2. 
Consider the following eight matrices	 *11A , 
*2
1P , 
*3
1P , 
*4
1T , 
*1
2A , 
*2
2P , 
*3
2P 	 and 
*4
2T . The 
corresponding matrices are given as follows, 
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The eight matrices contain two groups: the one group is the matrices	 *11A , 
*2
1P , 
*3
1P  
and *41T , the other group is the matrices 
*1
2A , 
*2
2P , 
*3
2P  and 
*4
2T .	The comparison results 
regarding three groups for Example 2 are presented in the Table 2. 
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Table 2 The comparison results regarding the three groups for Example 2 
 1z  2z  cw  
*1 *2 *3 *4( , , , )A P P T  2.87 1.13 (0.34,0.54,0.12)T  
*1 *2 *3 *4
1 1 1 1( , , , )A P P T  1.89 0.53 (0.32,0.16,0.52)
T  
*1 *2 *3 *4
2 2 2 2( , , , )A P P T  5.06 2.03 (0.20,0.40,0.40)
T  
Finally, we make the equivalent comparative analysis for the GDM of Example 3. 
Consider the following twelve matrices which have the same preference values but different 
self-confidence levels with the corresponding matrices of Example 3. 
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⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟
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( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
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( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
s l s l s l s l s l
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⎜ ⎟
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The twelve matrices also contain two groups: the one group is the matrices *11A , 
*2
1A , 
*3
1P , 
*4
1P , 
*5
1T  and 
*6
1T , the other group is the matrices 
*1
2A , 
*2
2A , 
*3
2P , 
*4
2P , 
*5
2T  and 
*6
2T . 
The comparison results regarding the three groups for Example 3 are presented in the Table 3. 
Table 3 The comparison results regarding the three groups for Example 3 
 1z  2z  cw  
*1 *2 *3 *4 *5 *6( , , , , , )A A P P T T  3.43 0.50 (0.40,0.34,0.20,0.05,0.01)T  
*1 *2 *3 *4 *5 *6
1 1 1 1 1 1( , , , , , )A A P P T T  5.70 0.64 (0.32,0.30,0.20,0.10,0.08)
T  
*1 *2 *3 *4 *5 *6
2 2 2 2 2 2( , , , , , )A A P P T T  8.08 0.82 (0.36,0.30,0.18,0.09,0.07)
T  
From Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3, we notice that different self-confidence levels lead to 
different collective preference vectors. Thus the self-confidence levels have certain influence 
on the GDM results. 
6. Conclusions 
In this study, we define a new kind of preference relation, called preference relation with 
self-confidence. Then, we present a two-stage linear programming model to deal with the 
GDM problem based on heterogeneous preference relations with self-confidence. The main 
contributions presented are as follows: 
(1) This study defines the preference relations with self-confidence, which allow 
decision makers to have multiple self-confidence levels to express their preferences 
regarding pairs of alternatives. 
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(2) We propose a two-stage linear programming model for estimating the collective 
preference vector in the GDM based on heterogeneous preference relations with 
self-confidence.  
Finally, a comparison study is conducted to demonstrate the influence of self-confidence 
levels on the GDM results. It will be an interesting future research to find out possible 
relationships among preferences, self-confidence assessments and results. Meanwhile, the 
consensus problem is a hot topic in GDM [2, 7, 10, 17, 32, 37], and it will be interesting to 
investigate the consensus reaching model in GDM based on heterogeneous preference 
relations with self-confidence.  
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